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Martinez Guzman (Wilber) v. Dist. Ct. (State), 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 61 (Sep. 30, 2021)1 
 




Martinez Guzman was indicted by a grand jury for five burglaries and four murders 
occurring in two counties. In Martinez Guzman I, the Nevada Supreme Court vacated an order 
denying dismissal for improper jurisdiction and remanded for reconsideration. There, the court 
held that territorial jurisdiction depends on whether the necessary statutory connections to the 
location of the court exist.2 Here, the court again granted a writ of mandamus for Martinez 
Guzman. Because the court concluded the nexus between acts committed in one county were not 
sufficiently connected to offenses occurring in another, it considered the district court’s venue 
determination to be a manifest abuse of discretion. The Nevada Supreme Court thus ordered that 




Martinez Guzman was charged with five burglaries and four murders at three homes over 
two weeks. He stole twice from outbuildings at the David home in Washoe County. There, he took 
a revolver and ammunition. Within the week, he used that gun to kill Constance Koontz and Sophia 
Renken and burglarize their residences in Douglas County. He then returned to the David home, 
burglarizing it and killing Gerald and Sharon David. Four days later, Martinez Guzman was 
arrested. He confessed to committing the crimes after he had observed the homes as a landscaper. 
He told police he drove the same car to each of the properties; in the car, police discovered a 
revolver, ammunition, a name tag from the David home, and a pendant and document from the 
Koontz home.  
 
 A grand jury in Washoe County indicted Martinez Guzman for ten felonies. But Martinez 
Guzman argued that under state statute, the grand jury did not have jurisdiction to indict him for 
the Douglas County charges.3 The district court determined that the court’s territorial jurisdiction 
extended statewide and denied the motion to dismiss.4 The Nevada Supreme Court granted the 
defendant’s writ of mandamus, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded the case for the 
lower court to determine whether venue would be proper in Washoe County for the Douglas 
County charges based on a sufficient connection between the acts and offenses.5  
 
 At the rehearing, Martinez Guzman argued that proper venue was not established under the 
two relevant state statutes. The state argued that venue was supported by those statutes and others. 
Again, the district court concluded that Washoe County was an appropriate venue for all charges 
 
1  By Alyssa Williams.  
2  Martinez Guzman v. Second Judicial Dis. Court (Martinez Guzman I), 136 Nev. 103, 109–10, 460 P.3d 443, 449 
(2020). 
3  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 172.105 (allowing grand juries to “inquire into all public offenses triable in the district 
court or in a Justice Court, committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court for which it is 
impaneled”). 
4  Martinez Guzman I, 136 Nev. at 105, 460 P.3d at 446. 
5  Id. at 104, 460 P.3d at 445. 
and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Martinez Guzman then petitioned the Nevada 
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus on the ground that the district court’s venue determination 




 As an initial matter, the court noted that mandamus was proper to address the salient, 
disputed issue of what is the sufficient connection between where a crime is committed and where 
it is charged that must exist to make venue proper.  
 
Neither the formation of intent or preparatory acts standing alone provide a basis for venue 
 
NRS 171.030 provides that when a crime “or the acts or effects thereof constituting or 
requisite to the consummation” of the crime occur in more than one county, either is an appropriate 
venue.6  The state argued that venue was proper because intent was necessary to commit the 
Douglas County crimes and it could have been formed in Washoe County. But the court found that 
assuming an element of the crime is an “act or effect” would conflate actus reus and mens rea. 
Based on statutory interpretation, the court held that intent is not an “act” and is thus an insufficient 
statutory basis for venue, unless accompanied by an action furthering that intent. 
 
 The court then addressed an issue of first impression: whether alleged preparatory acts for 
an offense are actions “requisite to the consummation” of that charge.7 The state argued, and the 
court rejected, that obtaining the gun in Washoe County predicated the burglaries and murders in 
Douglas County. The court referenced analogous state statutes to interpret “preparatory acts” under 
NRS 171.030. California courts have held that its nearly identical statute8 allows venue based on 
either preparatory acts or the effects of preparatory acts.9 Other jurisdictions, however, have ruled 
that even if a crime could not be committed without certain actions, purely preparatory acts are an 
insufficient basis for venue.10 Here, the court determined that venue in Nevada cannot lay upon 
preparatory acts without evidence to show those actions intended to further the charged offense.  
 
Evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to support venue  
 
Next, the court applied the rule to the facts. That is, the court evaluated whether evidence 
of a preparatory act in Washoe County plus intent for committing the Douglas County crimes was 
presented to the grand jury. The state relied on Walker v. State to argue that venue was proper 
 
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.030. 
7  Id. 
8  Compare Cal. Penal Code § 781 (West 2020), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.030; see also People v. Britt, 87 P.3d 
812, 818 (Cal. 2004), disapproved on other grounds by People v. Correa, 278 P.3d 809 (Cal. 2012) (holding that 
§ 781 is a venue statute despite speaking in terms of jurisdiction). 
9  People v. Simon, 25 P.3d 598, 617 (Cal. 2001) (allowing venue in the county where a gun was obtained when the 
defendant committed murder in another county); People v. Posey, 82 P.3d 755, 773 (Cal. 2004) (permitting venue in 
a county where a person received a call regarding a crime when the defendant placed it outside of the county). 
10  E.g., State v. Preite, 564 P.2d 598, 601 (Mont. 1977) (holding that preparatory acts that are not essentials of the 
crime provide no basis for venue); Crittendon v. State, 388 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding 
that preparation is not an elemental act “constituting or requisite to the commission” to a crime, even if those actions 
are necessary to commit that crime). 
because intent could have been formed in either county.11 The Walker court held that because it 
was not possible to provide evidence as to precisely where a crime was committed, venue was 
valid in a county where a preparatory or requisite act could have occurred.12  
 
Here, however, the court concluded the evidence supported the intention to steal from the 
Douglas County homes preceded procuring the revolver in Washoe County. The court could not 
point to evidence that Martinez Guzman sought to steal the gun specifically—let alone took it in 
preparation for the subsequent burglaries and murders. The court noted that actions which may 
have been preparatory are distinct from preparatory acts occurring and giving rise to venue in one 
county for a crime entirely committed in another. Therefore, the court found that not only was the 
state’s theory too speculative but that the evidence did not support venue.  
 
Venue must be supported by evidence that proves more than mere possibilities  
 
NRS 171.060 allows for a county to charge burglary when property is brought there after 
being taken from a different county during a burglary.13 The district court agreed with the state’s 
argument that venue was proper under this statute because items from the Koontz home were inside 
of Martinez Guzman’s car. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, found that the district court 
manifestly abused its discretion because the statute only applied to the Koontz burglary and was 
still an inappropriate basis for venue. The court concluded that the grand jury was presented with 
only the mere possibility that the property was in the vehicle when Martinez Guzman traveled 
from Douglas County to Washoe County. Because the state did not show proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence, the court determined that venue was inappropriate under NRS 171.060. 
 
Intercounty venue is distinct from interstate jurisdiction and joinder  
 
 Lastly, the court concluded intercounty venue cannot rest upon NRS 171.020 or NRS 
173.115(1). NRS 171.020 provides that if an act that executes an intent to commit or results in the 
commission of a crime occurs within the state, Nevada is a proper venue.14 NRS 173.115(1) allows 
the joinder of multiple offenses based on “the same act or transaction” or acts that constitute “a 
common scheme or plan.”15 The court found that the former applies to interstate jurisdiction and 
the latter does not concern venue at all. Thus, the district court erred in considering these statutes 




11  78 Nev. 463, 376 P.2d 137 (1962). 
12  Id. at 470–71, 376 P.2d at 140–41. In Walker, the state could not produce evidence to show exactly where a 
murder occurred but noted that the hitchhiker must have killed the driver after being picked up in Elko and before 
arriving in Reno. 
13  NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.060. 
14  Id. § 171.020.  
15  Id. § 172.115(1).  
Conclusion 
 
 The court declined to extend the bounds of venue’s pliancy,16 deciding that neither intent 
nor a preparatory act alone is a sufficient basis for venue. But if a preponderance of the evidence 
shows intent coupled with an act, venue may be proper. However, it is not enough to present 
evidence that allows the grand jury to merely speculate that intent could have formed in the county 




 According to the dissent authored by Justice Pickering, almost all courts, including the 
Nevada Supreme Court, agree that alleged criminal acts provide the “necessary connection” to 
establish proper venue.17 Justice Pickering found that the evidence presented here showed the 
nexus between the acts committed in Washoe County and the offenses occurring in a Douglas 
County.  
 
 Because Nevada and California have nearly identical intercounty venue statutes, Justice 
Pickering would interpret § 171.030 in accordance with § 781.18 California courts have held that 
venue is permitted in a county where only preparatory acts have occurred and the acts need not 
constitute an offense element.19 That is, venue is proper if a jury can reasonably infer from the 
facts that acts committed in one county were likely preparation for the crime committed in 
another.20 The dissent’s rule differed from the majority opinion by finding that a sufficient 
connection between the forum county and the defendant’s offense related acts, standing alone, may 
satisfy Nevada state statute.21 
  
 Justice Pickering also asserted that the majority’s factual inquiry of intent posed a 
substantive question for the jury that belied Nevada law.22 Rather, he saw the absence of an intent 
requirement as a clear implication that the legislature intended for the statute to enable venue 
within multiple counties.23 The justice pointed out that Martinez Guzman confessed to using the 
revolver he stole in Washoe County to commit the burglaries and murders in Douglas County. 
 
16  See Zebe v. State, 112 Nev. 1482, 1484, 1484–85, 929 P.2d 927, 929 (1996) (“[E]ach county will have 
independent jurisdiction over a criminal offender for conduct occurring in that county.”). 
17  Martinez Guzman v. Second Judicial Dis. Court (Martinez Guzman I), 136 Nev. 103, 109–10, 460 P.3d 443, 449 
(2020). 
18  Supra note 8. 
19  Supra note 9; see also People v. Thomas, 274 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2012). 
20  People v. Price, 821 P.2d 610, 640 (Cal. 1991). 
21  Justice Pickering additionally noted that jurisdictions following the majority approach (i.e., requiring proof of an 
act and intention to further the offense to lay venue in the proposed forum) have constitutional guarantees limiting 
criminal venue, whereas California and Nevada do not. See People v. Posey, 82 P.3d 755, 765 (Cal. 2004); Walker 
v. State, 78 Nev. 463, 472, 376 P.2d 137, 141 (1962). 
22  Compare Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1197, 196 P.3d 465, 481 (2008) (holding that the jury must determine 
whether a defendant had the requisite intent to commit an offense), with Martinez Guzman I, 136 Nev. at 11, 460 
P.3d at 450 (finding that venue is a question of law for the court). 
23  Compare with its sister statute NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.020 (“Whenever a person, with intent to commit a crime, 
does any act within this State in execution or part execution of such intent, which culminates in the commission of a 
crime, either within or without this State, such a person is punishable for such crime in this State . . . .”). 
Because he found that such evidence formed a sufficient connection to the proposed forum, the 
justice saw no legal or practical demand split the charges into two trials in two counties.  
 
 Finally, Justice Pickering concluded that venue was proper even under the majority’s 
interpretation of NRS 171.030. The state must prove venue by preponderance of the evidence,24 
meaning evidence that suggests the existence of the contested fact is more likely than its 
nonexistence.25 Martinez Guzman twice stole from the David home in Washoe County without 
entering the primary residence and without a weapon. Only after he took the revolver from there 
did he burglarize residences and murder occupants in Douglas County. Justice Pickering believed 
a reasonable jury could find it was more likely than not that the Washoe County acts were intended 
to commit the Douglas County offenses. Thus, the justice found sufficient evidence was presented 





24  McNamara v. State, 132 Nev. 606, 615–16, 377 P.3d 106, 113 (2016). 
25  Abbott v. State, 122 Nev. 715, 734, 138 P.3d 462, 475 (2006). 
